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though Civil Service was a matter of state concern, the administration of
civil service was not. The administration of civil service is a matter of local
concern and came within the definition of local property, affairs or government. 45
This approach would seem to be consistent with the letter and the spirit of the
1964 Amendment. In analyzing the approach taken by the court in the instant
case toward the question of state concern, two flaws appear. First, fire protec-
tion has been held to be a matter of local affairs rather than state concern.40
Although there is no direct holding classifying police protection as a matter of
local affair, there are many decisions holding certain aspects of the police de-
partment, such as wages, hours of work, pension plans, as being matters related
to the property, affairs or government of local municipalities. 47 This prior case
law makes the holding of the court in the instant case rather weak when it states
that the state law setting the residency requirements of police officers is dealing
with a matter of state concern. The second flaw of the court's opinion in the
instant case is that even if this area (police protection) could be considered a
matter of state concern, the reasoning of the Caparco case would justify a
holding that the particular area involved (residency requirements) was a matter
of local concern. The specific area involved rather than the general subject
matter is determinative. These are just a few of the questions which must be
answered by the courts when construing the 1964 Amendment. The answers will
determine to a great extent the future course of the home rule movement in
New York.
DAVID M. BROWN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL Now AvAIL-
ABLE TO MISDEMEANANTS TRIED IN SPECIAL SESSIONS COURTS
Defendant, a nineteen year old youth, along with two others, was arrested
at an apple orchard in the Town of Ramapo, Rockland County, on September
12, 1961, at approximately 10:30 P.M. while helping himself to half a bushel of
apples valued at about two dollars. The owner of the orchard, having caught one
of the youths in the act, filed an information with the Justice of the Peace charg-
ing the defendants with petit larceny. The defendant appeared before the Justice
of the Peace at a little past midnight that same evening, whereupon he was in-
formed of the charge against him and instructed in the following manner: 1
45. Id. at 217, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
46. See Holland v. Bankson, 290 N.Y. 267, 49 N.E.2d 16 (1943) ; Osborn v. Cohen, 272
N.Y. 55, 4 N.E.2d 289 (1936).
47. Allmendinger v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 142, 46 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
aff'd, 269 App. Div. 691, 54 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1st Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 644, 64 N.E.2d 712
(1945); Gorman v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 865, 109 N.E.2d 881 (1952).
1. These proceedings were held pursuant to N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 699.
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You are entitled to the aid of counsel in every stage of these pro-
ceedings, and before any further proceedings are had. You are entitled
to an adjournment for that purpose and upon your request I will send
a message to any counsel you name within this jurisdiction. Do you
desire counsel?
2
Defendant, having neither a prior police record nor experience with criminal
proceedings, answered, "No." The defendant pleaded guilty to the charge and
was convicted and sentenced by the Justice of the Peace, sitting as a Court of
Special Sessions, to serve thirty days in jail and pay a twenty-five dollar fine.
Since he was without funds to pay said amount, the defendant's sentence was
increased to fifty-five days. He subsequently appealed to the Rockland County
Court which affirmed the conviction but found his sentence to be excessive and
reduced it to seven days, the time already served. Leave to appeal having been
granted, the Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, reversed the convic-
tion. The Court held that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional and
statutory right to counse 3 because the lower court had failed to inform him of
the availability of court-assigned counsel if he desired an attorney but could not
afford one, thereby making the defendant's negative response an ineffective
waiver of his right to counsel. People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d
358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965).
The fundamental right of an accused to have the aid and advice of counsel
in criminal cases is constitutionally guaranteed 4 and is binding upon the States
under the mandate of due process.5 Two ". . . essential elements inherent in the
principle of right to counsel [are] the right to be informed of one's right to
counsel and the right in certain circumstances to have counsel appointed by
the court."0 The latter right, in the absence of an effective waiver, was granted
in the Federal courts to all indigent criminals by judicial mandate,7 and was
read into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requiring the
States to provide legal representation to any indigents accused of a capital
offense.8 This movement was climaxed in the recent decision of Gideon v. Wain-
wright9 which extended the States' duty to provide assigned counsel to a de-
2. People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 394, 207 N.E.2d 358, 359, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413-14
(1965).
3. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 8,
188, 308, 699; People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 565, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70,
74 (1961); People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 353-354, 165 N.E.2d 551, 553, 197 N.Y.S.2d
697, 700-01 (1960).
4. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. Birzon, Kasanof & Forma, The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Accused in Courts
of Criminal Jurisdiction in New York State, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 428, 430 (1965).
7. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275
(1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); codified into Fed. R. Crim. P. 44. See gen-
erally Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 1
(1944).
8. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Krash, The
Right to a Lawyer: The Implications of Gideon v. Wainwright, 39 Notre Dame Law. 150
(1964). The reversal of the "special circumstances" test in Betts was urged by several critics,
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fendant in any non-capital felony trial desiring the assistance of counsel but
lacking sufficient funds to secure his own. This right has long existed in New
York at common law' ° and was later expressed in statutory form in 188111 along
with provisions creating the procedural machinery through which a person ac-
cused of crime was to be advised by the magistrate at the initial confrontation
between the defendant and the State of his right to have counsel at every stage
of the proceedings.' 2
The statutory obligations of an arraigning magistrate in New York with
respect to a defendant appearing before him is to clearly and unequivocally",
inform' 4 him of his right to have counsel for his defense and to provide the
defendant ample opportunity to secure counsel if he desires.' 5 In Special Ses-
sions courts, where a Justice of the Peace sits with dispositive jurisdiction
over misdemeanors,1 6 the New York Code of Criminal Procedure section 699
provides that ".. . the magistrate must immediately inform [the defendant] ...
of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and before
any further proceedings are had, ...must allow the defendant a reasonable
time to send for counsel, and adjourn the proceedings for that purpose."17 The
rights conferred by this section may be waived by the defendant 8 "if the
waiver be a knowing, deliberate and informed relinquishment of that right."' 0
In order to further effectuate the purpose of insuring the constitutional guarantee
of civil rights in this area, the New York legislature enacted section 308 to the
Code which compels the arraigning magistrate to assign counsel to any exiguous
defendant demanding legal representation during the prosecution of an indictable
crime.
e.g., Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 De Paul
L. Rev. 213, 230-33 (1959); Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 Va.
L. Rev. 1150-9 (1963); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1962). See
Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1957).
10. E.g., People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 331, 61 N.E. 286, 308 (1901) ; People ex rel.
Saunders v. Board of Supervisors, 1 Sheld. (N.Y.) 517 (Buffalo Superior Ct. 1875); People
ex rel. Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 4 N.Y. Crim. 102 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd mem., 102 N.Y.
691 (1886).
11. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308. Compare People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 412, 187 N.E.
288, 299 (1933) which stated that, "even prior to section 303 ... there was inherent power
in the courts to assign counsel to defend a prisoner who was without an attorney and unable
to employ one." See People ex rel. Acritelli v. Grout, 87 App. Div. 193, 84 N.Y.S. 97, 18 N.Y.
Crim. 1 (1st Dep't 1903), aff'd, 177 N.Y. 587, 70 N.E. 1105 (1904).
12. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 8, 188, 699.
13. People v. Brantle, 13 A.D.2d 839, 216 N.Y.S.2d 329 (2d Dep't 1961); People v.
Hinsch, 3 A.D.2d 915, 162 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2d Dep't 1957).
14. People v. Mulhearn, 22 Misc. 2d 689, 199 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Ct. of Spec. Sess., 1960).
15. People v. Marincic, 2 N.Y.2d 181, 139 N.E.2d 529, 158 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1957); People
v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
16. N.Y. Const. art. 6, §§ 15(c), 17(a) ; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 56, 60; N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. Act §§ 30, 31; N.Y. Justice Ct. Act § 2.
17. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 699(1),(2).
18. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 699(4).
19. People v. Palmer, 296 N.Y. 324, 328, 73 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1947). See e.g., Matter of
Bojinoff v. People, 299 N.Y. 145, 151-2, 85 N.E.2d 909, 912 (1949). Cf. United States v. Fay,
242 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 239 F. Supp.
851 (D.C.N.Y. 1965).
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In the principal case, the majority of the court, led by Chief Judge Desmond,
engage in a significant piece of progressive judicial legislation. In arriving at the
conclusion that the defendant could not have effectively and intelligently waived
his right to counsel, the Chief Judge points to the facts20 in the case and argues
that they "create an inference of fact" precluding a valid waiver. He then ad-
dresses himself to the major issue of whether there was any deprivation of the
defendant's "fundamental right to counsel.' 2 1 The holding of the Court is
developed through two distinct, yet inseparable steps. In the first place, since
the right to counsel in New York is well established and has always included
the right to have counsel assigned by the court in cases of indigency, the Court
is now extending the right to assigned counsel to indigent misdemeanants.
Spurred perhaps by the principle expressed in the Gideon case which held that
constitutional due process requires the assignment of counsel to indigent felons in
state courts, the majority now acknowledges that this "basic minimal right" to
counsel will not be "restricted to prosecutions for major crimes" in this juris-
diction.22 The breadth of this formulation, however, opens the door to many
serious issues which would be pressed upon the Court in subsequent cases, viz.,
the retroactivity 23 of the Witenski decision and whether the right to assigned
counsel extends to such minor criminal offenses as traffic infractions. 24 It is in
the area of the probable effect of Witenski that the dissenting opinion by Judge
Bergan criticizes the majority for lightly dismissing the many serious and com-
plex problems involved in the administration of the assigned counsel program.
Judge Bergan points out as follows:
In many rural towns in the Third and Fourth Departments there
are no resident lawyers and in many there are no lawyers who practice
in the local courts of the town.
If a Justice of the Peace in one of the remote towns of Clinton
County, for example, undertook to assign a lawyer in Plattsburgh to
defend in his court a misdemeanor case, a number of practical obstacles
to any effective result come readily to mind. Of all the lawyers in Clin-
ton only two are listed as having offices outside of Plattsburgh in the
current Legal Directory25
The minority recommends that, "A change of this kind in the processes of crimi-
nal law would be unworkable without extensive implementation which, in turn,
20. In determination by a court of whether or not a proper waiver of counsel was
effected, such factors as the defendant's youth, background, experience and conduct enter
into consideration, bearing in mind that courts do not presume acquiescence in loss of funda-
mental rights, or that the accused knew of the right to counsel. People v. Richetti, 109
N.Y.S.2d 29, 43-44 (County Ct., 1951).
21. People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
22. Cf. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 1965) citing the famous case
of Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
23. Cf. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S.
2 (1963) applying Gideon retroactively. See generally Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher
Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 Yale L. Rev. 606-09 (1965).
24. Compare People v. Kohler, 45 Misc. 2d 692, 258 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1965) with
People v. Stein, 391 Misc. 2d 47, 262 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Dist. Ct., Nassau County 1965).
25. Instant case at 399, 207 N.E.2d at 362, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
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ought to be in the form of statutory enactment, and perhaps also be accompa-
nied by an appropriation of public money."26 The statistics 27 quoted by the
majority in attempted rebuttal, do not effectively answer the argument of the
dissent. It is submitted that an inherent fallacy in the reasoning of the majority
is that in actual distribution, especially in rural counties which lack a con-
centrated urban area of any appreciable size, the ratio of lawyers to population
is vastly disproportionate to the one per three hundred average distribution
relied upon by the majority.28 In the second line of reasoning, the majority re-
stricts the holding of the case to the mere extension of the "procedural require-
ments" of section 699 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to include the provi-
sions of section 308. The effect of this interpretation is aptly formulated by
the minority: "The court now for the first time is imposing on Special Sessions
the duty of informing persons charged with misdemeanors not only that they
have a right to aid of counsel but also 'as to the availability of assigned coun-
sel.' "29 This will compel the arraigning magistrate or Justice of the Peace at
Special Sessions to assign counsel to any indigent defendant who requests the
aid of an attorney. The majority concedes that there is no direct authority in-
terpreting section 699 for holding that a defendant must be informed of the
availability of assigned counsel upon arraignment, 0 but based on consideration
of the common law of New York which was later expressed in statutory form,8 1
and dicta in People v. Marincic,82 the Court decides to "now hold that such
information must be provided," thus giving sections 308 and 699 a conjoint
effect and interpreting section 699 as being supplemented in purpose by its
extension in scope. The justification of the majority for the principle announced
in Witenski was to correct ". . . so gross a violation of [the defendant's] fun-
26. Instant case at 398, 207 N.E.2d at 362, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 418. An excellent survey and
evaluation of the existing systems for providing counsel for criminal indigents in New York
State can be found in Birzon, Kasanof & Forma, supra note 6; Special Committee of the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York and the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, Equal justice for the Accused (1959) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.C. Special Com-
mittee]; but for an extensively comprehensive study in this area on a national level, see
Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State Courts-A Field Study
and Report (1965).
27. The Chief judge states: "There are about 54,000 registered lawyers in this State,
or one lawyer to every 300 inhabitants." Instant case at 398, 207 N.E.2d at 362, 259 N.Y.S.2d
at 417.
28. According to the 1965 New York Lawyers Diary and Manual (Legal Diary Pub.
Co.), there are 53 registered attorneys in Clinton County, only five of which are listed outside
of Plattsburgh, which serve a county population of approximately 73,000 (1960 Census): a
ratio of 1:1377.
29. Instant case at 398, 207 N.E.2d at 362, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 417-8.
30. However there is direct authority to the contrary in People v. Meers, 28 Misc. 2d
60, 211 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. 1960); and also in People v. Sprung, 13 A.D.2d 877, 215
N.Y.S.2d 517 (3d Dep't 1961) and People v. Crin, 303 N.Y. 749, 103 N.E.2d 538 (1952) by
implication.
31. See text accompanying notes 9-12, supra.
32. 2 N.Y.2d 181, 139 N.E.2d 529, 158 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1957); see also People v. Banner,
5 N.Y.2d 109, 154 N.E.2d 553, 180 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1958); People v. Brantle, 13 A.D.2d 839,
216 N.Y.S.2d 329 (2d Dep't 1961).
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damental rights"33 which would be evinced by restricting the right to be in-
formed and availed of assigned counsel only to "prosecutions for major crimes."
Prior to the Witenski decision,34 legislation was drafted by the office of the
New York Attorney General designed to provide assigned representation to
indigent criminals. This proposal was originally intended to be submitted to a
legislative committee for study purposes only. However, subsequent to the ad-
judication in Witenski, a public hearing was held35 by the Senate and Assembly
Codes Committees upon request of Attorney General Lefkowitz wherein he an-
nounced the submission of the bill to the legislature for consideration and urged
its passage. The hearing was called to alert all the bar associations and other in-
terested persons of the recent recommendation to submit the bill for legislative
action in the light of the new policy set down in Witenski. 30 Approximately a
month later, the Anderson-Bartlett Bill, 37 as it was denominated, was passed by
the legislature and signed by the Governor 38 on July 16, 1965 becoming Chapter
878 of the Laws of New York, 1965 Regular Session,, effective December 1,
1965. 39 The bill, modelled somewhat after the Federal Criminal Justice Act of
1964,40 amended sections 188, 190, 308 and 699 and repealed section 189 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 4' and codifies the mandate in Witenski requiring an
arraigning magistrate to inform the defendant that "if he desires the aid of coun-
sel and is financially unable to obtain counsel, then counsel shall be assigned." In
addition, it amended the County Law inserting a new article, Article 18-B: pro-
viding for the assignment of counsel for indigents on arraignment charged with
any crime, specifically denoting the types of crimes intended to be included
within the article; 42 providing for the mandatory establishment by all the coun-
33. Instant case at 397, 207 N.E.2d at 361, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 417. Compare People v.
Shenandoah, 9 N.Y.2d 75, 172 N.E.2d 548, 211 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1961).
34. The principal case was decided on April 22, 1965.
35. The hearing was held in Albany on May 25, 1965.
36. The telegrams sent out by the Attorney General announcing the public hearing and
setting forth the purpose of the bill, contained the following statements: "This bill to require
assignment of counsel upon arraignment on any charge would codify recent decision Court of
Appeals in Witenski. The bill would provide practical means to meet this obligation...."
37. Senate Int. 2755, Pr. 2911, 5844-Warren M. Anderson; Assembly Int. 4786, Pr.
4909-Richard J. Bartlett.
38. In a memorandum approving this and another bill, Governor Rockefeller stated:
In our society, the right to counsel is as indispensible as the right to a fair trial,
and both must be protected if our system of justice under law is to continue and
flourish. New York has always been a leader in the protection of the rights of its
citizens and the approval of [this] . . . bill especially marks another great step
forward in that tradition. In recent weeks, the highest court in this State has made
it unmistakably clear that every defendant charged with crime must be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to obtain the services of counsel. This bill provides the
machinery for guaranteeing the true exercise of that right.
39. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 878, § 8.
40. 18 U.S.C. 3006A (1964).
41. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 878, §§ 2-6.
42. The new addition to the County Law, § 722-a sets forth this definition of crime:
For the purposes of this article [18-B of the County Law], the term "crime"
shall mean a felony, misdemeanor, or the breach of any law of this state or of any
law, local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, other than one
that defines a "traffic infraction," for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment is
authorized upon conviction thereof.
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ties in the State of a systematic program for furnishing counsel to any persons
unable to obtain counsel; and requiring the compensation and reimbursement of
counsel furnishing such services necessary for an adequate defense, This is a
vast improvement over the former statutory and local policies of providing free
criminal representation to indigents, who comprise a large segment, if not a
majority of the criminal offenders in New York 43 and other jurisdictions.44
The problem of the indigent accused and the handicaps he suffers in his
ability to enjoy his constitutional rights and privileges, at least in the realm
of effective criminal representation, has been somewhat rectified in New York
in the past year by both the judiciary and the legislature. The Witenski decision,
which was very instrumental45 in promoting the passage of the Anderson-Bart-
lett Bill, provided the stimulus necessary to adjust the law to respond to the
social problem of the inequity of the poor man caught in the law enforcement
machinery of society. The question which immediately comes to mind, however,
is whether this will suffice to insure adequate legal representation for the in-
digent defendant. Since the flexibility of the new bill permits a county to estab-
lish any one of the four plans for representation 46 it may desire, there is nothing
to support the tacit implication that a particular county will necessarily set up a
program most advantageous to the indigent accused. 47 Moreover, it is not incon-
ceivable that a given county might choose to establish for example, the public
defender program in compliance with the statute and thereby merely create
another political plum with which to reward some loyal party supporter as
opposed to someone perhaps more dedicated or competent in the field of criminal
law. Certainly, this does not implement the intended advantage or benefit to the
indigent criminal comtemplated by the new statute. Likewise, there are intrinsic
weaknesses in the traditional coordinated assigned counsel program and the
privately operated legal aid plan.48 There seems to be no provision in either
43. Birzon, Kasanof & Forma, supra note 6, at 433, 436.
44. Silverstein, supra note 26; Attorney General's Report on Poverty and the Admini-
stration of Criminal Justice (1963).
45. See notes 36 and 38 supra. In the Attorney General's memorandum (#39) sup-
porting his recommendation of the Anderson-Bartlett bill, the pertinent remarks are:
It was believed at the time of the introduction of the proposed bill that present
New York statutory law requires assignment of counsel . . . only for an indictable
crime and only following indictment (CCP § 308). However, subsequent to the
introduction of the proposed bill, the Court of Appeals in People v. tWitenski inter-
preted the New York statutes to require that even in courts governed by § 699 of
the Code ... , an accused person must be instructed that if he cannot afford coun-
sel, the court will assign one to represent him, before any further court proceedings
take place.... New York standards on the right to counsel now make it incumbent
on counties to provide lawyers to defendants upon their first arraignment in court
in every type of criminal case .... The urgency of becoming organized to handle the
volume of assignments bound to follow the clear pronouncement in the Witenski
case caused the sponsors of the proposed bill to move ahead from September 1, 1966
to December 1, 1965 the date when a county plan must be put into operation.
46. The new § 722 of the County Law lists the private voluntary defender system, the
public defender system, the assigned counsel system or a combination of any of the foregoing
as alternative programs a county may select to comply with this section.
47. Birzon, Kasanof & Forma, supra note 6, at 453, n.138.
48. Id. at 433-34; N.Y.C. Special Committee, supra note 26, at 62-76, 86-94; Silverstein,
supra note 26, at 15-74.
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Witenski or its legislative counterpart aimed toward reducing the chances of an
indigent becoming the unfortunate victim of malfeasance resulting from inept
representation or a sham defense by assigned counsel. The serious problem of
adequacy or quality of assigned representation is yet to be acted upon by the
legislature or remedied by the courts49 of this State. This writer recommends that
the qualifications of all attorneys participating in any of the assigned counsel
programs be approved by the Appellate Division of their respective Depart-
ments, using whatever standards or criteria the judiciary deem necessary. Also in
this area, there is a lack of a standard workable test of indigency. Since indigency
is a very relative concept and not readily definable, perhaps some more attention
might be devoted to defining the maximum limits between the deserving indigent
and persons who might try to avail themselves of the opportunity to gain free
counsel while being reasonably able to retain their own counsel. 50 Only the future
will bear out the success or failure of this governmental attempt to overcome one
of the many inequalities in a social structure which purports to guarantee equal
civil rights and liberties to all of its members. The ultimate democratic goal of
the elimination of wealth as a factor affecting the quality and quantity of justice
doled out to an individual may perhaps never be completely achieved, but a more
substantial equality can now at least be realized by persons in this jurisdiction
encumbered by the burden of poverty.
DAVID A. GRZYWNA
DECEDENTS ESTATES--TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS-ADOPTED CHILDREN
Now PRESUMIED INCLUDED WITHIN CLASS TERM "ISSUE" AS USED IN WILLS
AND TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS
William G. Parks, the testator, died in 1909 creating testamentary trusts
for each of his surviving children. The income payable to each child for life
and "'as each of said children . . . dies, the principal of the trust fund of
such child . . . shall be distributed among his issue . . . in equal shares.' ,,
A, one of the testator's children, an income beneficiary for life, died in 1961.
B, A's son predeceased her. B's sole survivors were a natural daughter, C, and
an adopted son, D. The issue in this case concerns the rights of the two
children, C and D, to take the portion of the principal of the trust fund which
would have gone to their parent B had he survived his mother A. In determin-
ing the respective rights of the two children according to the provisions of
the will the surrogate decreed that the adopted child, D must be excluded from
49. But see People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 165 N.E.2d 551, 197 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1960).
See generally Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-
Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 289 (1964).
50. Silverstein, supra note 26, at 105-22.
1. In the Matter of the Estate of Park, 15 N.Y.2d 413, 416, 207 N.E.2d 859, 859, 260
N.Y.S.2d 169, 170 (1965).
